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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL DUKE TANNER, 
Defendant / Appellant. 
Case No: 20080043-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant Tanner's motion to compel 
discovery? "While a trial court is generally allowed broad discretion in granting or 
denying discovery, see State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 1026, 1027 (Utah 1982), '[t]he proper 
interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law, [and this Court should] review 
the trial court's decision for correctness.' Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, f 5, 989 P.2d 
1073; see also State v. Bybee, 2000 UT 43, f 10, 1 P.3d 1087." State v Spry, 2001 UT 
App 75, f 8, 21 P. 3d 675. This issue was preserved in pre-trial motion and in a hearing 
(R. 138-37,153,155, 159-57, 173-68, 186-85, 297). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in full in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Michael Duke Tanner appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Honorable Claudia Laycock, Fourth District Court, after he was convicted of multiple 
felony controlled substance violations. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Michael Tanner was charged by amended information filed in Fourth District Court on 
March 14, 2007 with: Count 1 - possession or use of a controlled substance, a second 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); Count 2 -
possession of drug paraphernal ia in a dmg free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5(a); Counts 4-8 - distribution or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance in a drug free zone, first degree felonies, in violation of 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (R. 27-25). Counts 1-2 allegedly were 
committed on February 7, 2007, while Counts 4-8 were allegedly committed in October, 
2006 (Id.). 
On March 29, 2007 Tanner filed a request for specific discovery seeking "any and 
all audio or visual recordings taken of conversations between the Defendant and the 
confidential informant" and "a copy of the field test results taken from the confidential 
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informant on all five occasions" (R 35) Tanner also filed a subpoena duces takem on 
the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force on April 9, 2007 seeking a copy of "the 
Return of Search Warrant Affidavit for the Search Warrant that was issued on January 
31, 2006 at 8 25 a m on the residence of 375 West 300 North, in Provo, Utah" (R 39-
38) 
Tanner was arraigned on May 9, 2007 and entered 4 not guilty" pleas to each count 
(R 50 49 289) 
On June 5 2007 Tannei filed another request tor specific disco\ery seeking a list 
of all witnesses the State intends to call at any hearing related to this matter, the identity 
of the confidential informant, and copies of the supporting affidavit and return of search 
warrant that was issued on October 25, 2006 at the residence of 375 West 300 North in 
Provo (R 56) 
On June 13, 2007 Tdimei filed d mutiuii to ^cvci uuunb> 1 diid 2 fiurn Luuntb 4-8 
(R 66-58) Later the parties stipulated to the severance (R 291 5,292 3,5) 
On June 27, 2007 Tanner filed a motion to compel specific discovery and also 
requested a continuance of the jury tnal, alleging that the State had not complied with his 
request for the names of witnesses, the identity of the confidential informant, and the 
affidavit supporting the October 25, 2006 search warrant (R. 75-73). At pre-tnal hearings 
on July 11, 2007 and August 1, 2007 Tanner advised the trial court that he still had not 
received discovery (R. 78-77, 81-80). 
On September 4 and 6, 2007 Tanner filed motions in limine, requesting that 
evidence of his pnor bad acts be excluded and seeking notice from the State of any 
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Evidence (R. 92-87, 142). 
On September 6, 2007 Tanner filed a motion for discovery seeking: the criminal 
history of the confidential informant, Arthur V Allred; and what charges Allied was 
"working off with the county's Major Crimes Task Force (R. 138-37). On September 
14, 2007 Tanner filed another request for discovery seeking a copy of the charges Alhed 
was working off during the period of Octobei 3-26. 2006 when he made controlled buys 
from Tannei (R 153j On September 18, 2007 Tannet requested a copy ol the return ot 
search warrant affidavit that was issued on October 18, 2006 on 375 West 300 North in 
Provo (R. 155). 
On September 25, 2007 Tanner filed a motion to compel discovery (R. 159-57). 
Tanner had served subpoenas with the Utah County Major Cnmes Task Force and/or the 
Provo City Attorney's Office thai had not been honored. Copies of the subpoenas were 
filed with the court (R. 170-68, 173-71). Specifically, Tanner requested a copy of the 
October 18, 2006 return of search warrant affidavit; copies of any other probable cause 
affidavits and search warrants for the same residence (375 West 300 North, Provo) 
between the dates of January 2006-January 2007; a copy of the Utah County Major 
Crimes Task Force procedures for controlled buys, and for using voluntary or paid 
confidential informants (R. 159-57). In addition, to responding to the motion to compel, 
the State filed a motion to quash the subpoenas (R. 176-75). Oral arguments were heard 
on the motions on October 10, 2007, and the trial court denied Tanner's motion to 
compel (R. 186-85, 297). 
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On October 16, 2007 a jury trial was held on counts 4-8 (R. 200-198, 288).1 After 
its deliberation, the jury convicted Tanner on all five counts (R. 199, 207-203, 288: 234-
38). 
On December 12, 2007 Tanner was sentenced on counts 4-8 to concurrent terms of 
five years to life at the Utah State Prison (R. 263-61, 298). On January 10, 2008 Tanner 
pled guilty to count 1, amended to a third degree felony, and count 2 was dismissed (R. 
277-75, 299). He was sentenced to concurrent statutory terms in the Utah State Prison 
with a recommendation that he receive credit for 341 days spent in jail (R. 276, 299). 
A notice of appeal was filed in Fourth District Court on January 11, 2008 and the 
matter was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Testimony of Officer Mark Troxell 
Mark Troxell is a sergeant with the Provo City Police Department (R. 288: 58-59). 
In October of 2006 he was assigned to the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force, 
supervising a team of detectives involved in drug investigations (R. 288: 59). Troxell 
testified that he had met Tanner prior to October, 2006 (R. 288: 64). 
Troxell met Arthur Allred when Allred was referred to the task force by the Utah 
County Attorney's Office in the late summer of 2006 because Allied had useful 
information (R. 288: 64, 105). Allred indicated he had information about Mike Tanner 
1
 To avoid confusion to the jury, the counts were renumbered at trial to counts 1-5. 
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and that he would be able to arrange another buy (R 288 65, 105) 
On October 3, 2006 Allred made a phone call to Tanner in Troxell's presence and 
arranged to purchase drugs (R 288 65-66) Troxell could not hear the conversation but 
the person Allred was talking to "sounded to be male" (R 288 106) Allred's vehicle, 
one of two tow trucks, and person were searched lor drugs and money before he met 
Tanner at 375 West 300 North in Provo, and no diugs or money were found on him oi his 
person (R 288 66-69,107 109) Allied uas also given $200 to puichasc the diugs (R 
288 68-69) The money was not marked (R 288 106) Allred went into the residence 
and came out with a small baggie containing a white granular substance (R 288 71) 
Troxell testified that the substance appeared to be methamphetamine (R 288 72) The 
location of the house is within a 1000 feet of Timpanogas Elementary School (R 288 
Troxell testified that late on the evening of October 5, 2006 another buy was 
conducted between Allred and Tanner at the same residence (R 288 74-75) The same 
procedures were followed except that Allred had already arranged the buy and the drugs 
he came out with weighed less (R. 288: 75-79) Again the officers did not observe the 
actual interaction/exchange between Allred and Tanner (R. 288: 77). 
On October 12, 2006 a third buy took place at approximately 6 p.m. (R. 288: 80-
81). Allred was again searched and officers found no drugs on his person prior to 
entering the residence (R. 288: 81, 84). Approximately fifteen minutes later, Allred exited 
the house (R. 288: 82). The officers followed him to another location and again searched 
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him and his truck (R. 288: 82). Ailred gave them a small plastic bindle containing a 
crystal substance (R. 288: 82-83). Ailred had been given $120 by the officers prior to 
going to the residence (R. 288: 83-84). 
On October 19, 2006 another transaction between Ailred and Tanner was arranged 
(R. 288: 84). Ailred was again searched before going to the residence and officers found 
no drugs (R. 288: 84). He was given $100 (R. 288: 84). Officers followed him to the 
same residence aftei dark (R 288: 84-85) Allied only icmained m the residence for 
"about a minute"' (R. 288: 85) He was followed to another location and was found to 
have a substance which appeared to be methamphetamine with him (R. 288: 85-86). 
Finally, on October 24, 2006 Alfred made a phone call and then officers followed 
him to the same residence around 9:30 p.m. (R. 288: 86-87). Again Alfred was searched 
and given $200 (R. 288: 87). He was observed to go into the residence (R. 288: 87). 
/Aiierwaras omcers met wim mm ai a separate location <VK. ZSS: 66). /\t mis location a 
small plastic baggy was observed by officers in Alfred's truck (R. 288: 88). It was open 
and had spilled on the truck's floormats, and Ailred "was quite excited and trying to 
sweep this up off the floor" (R. 288: 88, 92-93). Ailred was told to step back and he was 
searched (R. 288: 88). No suspected drugs were found outside of what was in the baggy 
in the truck (R. 288:88). 
Troxell testified that on one of the first two transactions he observed Tanner in the 
front yard with another male (R. 288: 81-82, 115-16). Ailred met them at the gate and 
followed Tanner and the other male into the home (R. 288: 82, 113). However, this 
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inrormation is not contained in Iroxelks police reports for either October 3ra or October 
6th (R 288 118) 
All five transactions occurred outside the view of the officers at the Tanner 
residence (R 288 89) Beloie and after Allred entered the residence he was in the line of 
sight of Troxell (R 288 89,110-11) The longest time Allred lemained in the residence 
was approximately thirty minutes (R 288 112) There were usually one or two vehicles 
in the dmewa} at the residence and sometimes an additional vehicle was paiked out 
front (R 288 117) Tioxell tan the license plates number and a daik gieen Corvette 
which was bioken down \\a^ legisteied to Tannei (R 288 117) Although Tioxell had 
the ability to body wire a confidential informant, Allred was never wired (R 288 117-
18) 
The parties stipulated that the substance contained in each of exhibits 2, 4, 6, 8 and 
10 was methamphetamine R^ 288 98; As a result, the repous from the crime lab 
(exhibits 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9) were admitted into evidence (R 28« 101-02) 
B Testimony of Arthur Allred 
Arthur Allred testified he has known Michael Tanner for approximately 18-24 
months (R. 288. 125) After he was arrested for prescription and credit card fraud, he 
became a confidential informant for the police and received a plea in abeyance on the 
charges for helping them out with three cases and testifying in court and for violating no 
laws for six months and paying a $300 fine (R. 288: 125-26,128). Since the entry of his 
plea in abeyance approximately six months prior to trial, he has testified in one other case 
(R. 288: 126-27). 
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Alfred testified that in October of 2006 he purchased drugs five times from 
Michael Tanner as part of his work with the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force (R. 
288: 129). On the first buy he contacted Tanner by cell phone while in the presence of 
Troxell and his partner, Bill Young (R. 288: 129-30). He got Tanner's number from a 
friend (R. 288: 130). He told Tanner he needed to buy a teener or an eightball and was 
given a time for the buy (R. 288: 130). He was given money by the officers, and was 
searched thoroughly (R. 288: 130-31). He drove to Tanner's house and Tanner was out 
front (R. 288: 131). They talked for a minute and then went into the house to Tanner's 
bedroom (R. 288: 132). A woman named Stacy was in the room (R. 288: 132). Tanner 
had the drugs "ready" for him and they conversed for 5-7 minutes (R. 288: 133). He took 
the drugs and examined them and then gave Tanner the $200 cash (R. 288: 133). As he 
left, Stacy warned him "about what happens to people that tell on people for buying 
drugs" (R. 288: 134). 
On October 5-6, 2006 he met with the officers underneath the overpass in Provo 
(R. 288: 135). He called Tanner on his cell phone and arranged the buy (R. 288: 135). 
He was searched by officers and went to Tanner's house (R. 288: 135). He called Tanner 
again and was told to walk in the house (R. 288: 135-36). Allred walked into Tanner's 
bedroom and found Tanner with "a large amount of methamphetamine (5-10 ounces) that 
he was going through" (R. 288: 136). There were also scales and baggies (R. 288: 136). 
Tanner was separating the "clean shard" or "good stuff from the "cut crap" (R. 288: 
136). Allred was getting the "good stuff (R. 288: 136). He stayed approximately ten 
minutes (R. 288: 137). Tanner gave him the drugs and then he gave Tanner the money 
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(K. ZS8: 145). After he left, he drove to the meeting place set up by the task force (R. 
288: 137). He and his truck was searched (R. 288: 137). 
On October 12, 2006 he again met with the officers under the viaduct and 
arranged to buy from Tanner on his cell phone (R. 288: 137). He was searched and given 
money before driving to Tanner's residence (R. 288: 137). He called Tanner and was 
again told to walk into the house (R. 288: 137). He walked straight back into the 
bedroom and found two females in the room with Tanner, one of whom was engaged in 
sexual activity with Tanner (R. 288: 138). Allred remained in the room for 15-20 
minutes before exchanging the money for drugs with Tanner (R. 288: 138-39). He left 
and called the officers from his truck to tell them what he had seen in the house (R. 288: 
139). After he left his subsequent meeting with the officers where he and his truck were 
again searched, he discovered some spilt methamphetamine on his truck floor (R. 288: 
153, 155-56). He called the officers and pulled over (R. 288: 153). They came to him at 
the East Bay off-ramp and again searched his truck (R. 288: 153-54). 
On October 19, 2006 Allred again met the task force officers at the overpass and 
was searched thoroughly (R. 288: 139). After calling Tanner and obtaining the money 
from police, he drove to the house and Tanner was outside washing his black Corvette 
(R. 288: 139, 156). Tanner set the drugs on one side of the windshield and he put the 
money down on the other side (R. 288: 140). He then picked up the drugs and Tanner 
picked up the money (R. 288: 140). See also, R. 288: 162-64. They talked for a couple of 
minutes before Allred left (R. 288: 140). He drove to the meeting place and was again 
thoroughly searched by police (R. 288: 140). 
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On October 24, 2006 Allred and task force officers met at the overpass again (R. 
288: 140). He said that when he spoke with Tanner by telephone, Tanner was reluctant to 
sell to him because he'd recently been arrested (R. 288: 140). He drove to Tanner's 
house and Tanner threw the drugs on the grass while Allred put the money down on the 
porch after lighting a cigarette (R. 288: 140, 161). Allred did not go into the house but 
picked up the drugs from the lawn and spoke with Tanner, who was standing on the 
porch, for a couple of minutes before leaving (R. 288: 140, 157). He met officers back at 
the overpass and was again searched (R. 288: 141). 
Allred testified he was searched prior to each transaction and that he never brought 
drugs to the scene nor did he take drugs home with him (R. 288: 142). On the three buys 
he made inside the residence, he put the drugs Tanner gave him in a cigarette pack to 
carry them from the house (R. 288: 144, 150). On the other two buys he put the drugs in 
u;^ ~~^ i^ f / D ooo . 1 c m A W~~A A~~:~A , ^ ; ^ ^ ~~T, A^,^„ o:~^~ +u~ ~~^x, ^^ u:„ ~i™ ;« i n ^ U U L K C L t iv . z.oa. i^>uf. r \ u i C L i u c i n o u . U M I I H a n y L I I U H ^ ;MIIL>C M I C c i i n v KJL i i i> i n c a m 
JL v / 4^2 •/ O «/ XT 
abeyance (R. 288: 144). Allred also testified that he did not have to testify against 
Tanner as part of his plea in abeyance deal (R. 288: 145-47). Allred admitted to having a 
prior misdemeanor conviction for giving false information to a police officer (R. 288: 
146). 
Allred did not take any notes about the transactions and testified that his 
recollection of events would not be as accurate as a police report (R. 288: 181). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Tanner asserts that the material he requested from both the State and from the 
Major Crimes Task Force through subpoena was potentially exculpatory or mitigation, 
and that it was also material and necessary for proper preparation of a defense The trial 
court erred in denying his motion to compel and in quashing those subpoenas Tanner 
satisfied the requirements of Rule 16(a)(4) and or (5) and should have been provided with 
that disco\eiy, either directly from the State or thiough enloicement of his Subpoenas 
Accoidingly, he requests that this Court leveise his conwction and iemand the mattei 
back for a new trial with directions that his discovery lequests and/or subpoenas are to be 
honored. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Tanner's Motion to Compei Discovery and in 
Quashing his Subpoenas under Ruie 16(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
Prior to trial Tanner made several motions for specific discovery. In addition, he 
served subpoenas on the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force and the Provo City 
Attorney's Office. Copies of the subpoenas were filed with the court (R. 170-68, 173-
71). Specifically, Tanner requested a copy of the October 18, 2006 return of search 
warrant affidavit; copies of any other probable cause affidavits and search warrants for 
the same residence (375 West 300 North, Provo) between the dates of January 2006-
January 2007; a copy of the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force procedures for 
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controlled buys, and for using voluntary or paid confidential informants (R. 159-57). 
When these subpoenas were not honored, he filed a motion to compel with the trial court 
(R. 159-57). In response, the State filed to have the subpoenas quashed (R. 176-75). A 
hearing was held before the trial court on October 10, 2007, and the trial court denied 
Tanner's motion to compel (R. 186-85, 297). Tanner asserts that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to compel discovery and in essentially quashing his subpoenas. 
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure governs discovery. Subsection 
(a) reads in relevant part: 
Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon 
request the following material or information of which he has knowledge: 
.... (4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense 
r r \ r t - o n n r » £ * / i n u n i c n m a n f ' o r » n 
LKJL JL \^V-lU.W^«^l l ici l lX0111.JLJ.V^XlC, U.11VA 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown 
should be made vailable to the defendant in order for the defendant to adequately 
prepare his defense. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that: "a criminal proceeding is more than an 
adversarial contest between two competing sides. It is a search for truth upon which a 
just judgment may be predicated. Procedural rules are designed to promote that 
objective, not frustrate it" State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985). 
Tanner asserts that in denying his motion to compel discovery, and in essentially 
quashing his subpoenas, the trial court has frustrated the search for truth upon which a 
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the Return of the Search Warrant that was signed on or about October 18 and executed 
on October 25th, and as to copies of any other search warrants, probable cause affidavits 
and return of search warrants executed on Tanner's residence between January 2006-
2007. Tanner argued that such material was exculpatory under Rule 16(a)(4), but also 
that it satisfied the good cause standard under Rule 16(a)(5) (R. 183-78). 
The trial court seemed to focus its good cause analysis in legards to the subpoenas 
and Taniief s motion to compel on relevance and rules 401-40) of the Utah Rules of 
Ewdence (R 297: 17, 18). The trial court indicated she wasn't persuaded the information 
was relevant, but was instead "a waste of the jury's time, and it's not likely to bring us to 
evidence which is helpful or admissible" (Id.). Tanner asserts that this analysis, while, of 
course, appropriate and necessary for an ultimate determination of admissibility during 
trial, is not the focus or framework for determining whether good cause exists under Rule 
1 / ^ o V ^ \ 
In State v. Mickelson, 848 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1992), and State v. Spry, 2001 LIT 
App 75, 21 P3d 675, this Court examined the "good cause" required under Rule 16(a)(5). 
In both cases this Court drew from the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in Cannon v. 
Keller, 692 P.2d 740 (Utah 1984) and concluded: 
In defining 'good cause,' we reasoned that Cannon 'implicitly held that (1) "good 
cause" requires only a showing that disclosure of requested evidence is necessary 
to the proper preparation of the defense and (2) such a showing is made whenever 
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the trial court is apprised of the fact that the evidence is material to an issue to be 
raised at trial' [Mickelson] at 690 
Spry, 2001 UT App 75 at f 21 In both cases this court reasoned that this standard 
[OJptimally balances the rights and obligations of parties in criminal litigation and 
allows a defendant ample access to evidence m the State's possession, by 
requiring, as the only prerequisite to discovery, that the court be apprised of the 
infoimation s matenality to the case Nonetheless, b> lequuing defendants to 
make this preliminaiv showing of matcnahtv Cannon also cffectiveh piotects the 
State and the court from irrelevant and vexing discovery requests Thus the trial 
can be conducted with a minimum of unnecessary delay, while still allowing both 
parties a maximum of necessary preparation 
Mickelson, 848 P 2d at 690 See also, Spry, 2001 UT App 75 at f 21 
In Mickelson, annlvmg the siandard sei fonh dbove, this Court held that the 
defendant satisfied the good cause requirement by arguing before the trial court that the 
information requested—conviction records—would be admissible for impeachment 
purposes of the witness. Because this showing "clearly set forth the legitimate potential 
value of the requested evidence to the defense," it therefore, "established] the materiality 
of the evidence to the issues to be raised at trial." 848 P.2d at 690. See also, Spry, 2001 
UT App 75 at 122. 
In this case, Tanner asserts he, too, made such a showing before the trial court as 
to the materiality of the information sought and the necessity for it in order to have proper 
preparation of a defense at trial. The allegations in this case were that Tanner sold drugs 
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October 5, October 12, October 19, and October 24. The only two witnesses at trial were 
Allred and Officer Mark Troxell, a Provo City officer assigned to the Utah County Major 
Crimes Task Force. 
In the hearing on Tanner's motion to compel discovery, it was understood by the 
parties that a search warrant was issued on Tanner's residence on October 18, 2006—in 
between the third and fourth controlled buys—and it was executed on October 25, 2006, 
which was the day after the fifth buy. Apparently Allred, the CL provided information 
that the Task Force (and it can be assumed Troxell) used to secure the warrant. Equally 
apparent was the fact that no charges were filed as a result of that search warrant. Tanner 
wanted the Return of the Search Warrant in order to compare the information provided by 
the CI with what was actually found by the Officers and to use it for impeachment 
purposes against the CI at trial. 
Tanner also sought discovery of other warrants executed at Tanner's residence 
during the year in order to see if the same CI provided information that was used by 
police to secure those warrants. Troxell had stated in his supporting affidavit for the 
October 18, 2006 warrant that 'This residence was recognized as one where a Michael 
Duke Tanner lives and your affiant has been present during the service of other search 
warrants" (R. 178-79). Yet according to Tanner's criminal history, no charges were filed 
against him after the service of these other warrants. Accordingly, Tanner argued that 
there was a strong likelihood that the information provided for the probable cause 
necessary to obtain those warrants was not reliable; and if that information was provided 
16 
by the same CI, that information would be at least mitigating, perhaps even exculpatory, 
and certainly it was necessary to preparation of a proper defense. 
The trial court denied the motion to compel and quashed Tanner's subpoenas in 
part because there could be many reasons why charges weren't filed against Tanner from 
other warrants. However, interestingly enough, Officer Troxel testified at sentencing and 
this subject came up (R. 298: 6-9). At sentencing, Troxell appeared to argue against the 
recommendation for probation from AP&P. He testified that he had been invohed in 
multiple search warrants invohing Tanner (Id. at 6). However, when pressed by the tiial 
court about Tanner's lack of much criminal history, Troxell admitted that, "During those 
searches that I have been involved in previously, quantities of drugs were not found, so 
the charges could be brought" (Id. at 8). 
Tanner asserts that the material he requested from both the State and from the 
iviaior Crimes Task Force tinough subpoena ^as potentially exculpatory or mitigation 
and that it was also material and necessary for proper preparation of a defense. The trial 
court erred in denying his motion to compel and in quashing those subpoenas. Tanner 
satisfied the requirements of Rule 16(a)(4) and or (5) and should have been provided with 
that discovery, either directly from the State or through enforcement of his Subpoenas—a 
process anticipated and approved by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 
8, f 20, 974 P.2d 279 ("Rather than attempting to obtain the ARTEC, DFS, and CPS 
records through rule 16(a), Pliego should have attempted to get these records himself 
through subpoena under rule 14(b)). Accordingly, he requests that this Court reverse his 
17 
requests and/or subpoenas are to be honored. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Tanner requests this Court to reverse his conviction and sentence and the trial 
court's denial of his objection to Instruction No. 9A and remand for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of March, 2010 
Maigaiet P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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RULE 16. DISCOVERY 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the following material or 
information of which he has knowledge 
(1) relevant v\ ntten or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants, 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant, 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant, 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the de-
fendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment, and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be made available to the 
defendant in order for the defendant to adequate!) prepare his defense 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of charges and before the 
defendant is required to plead The prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure 
(c) bxcept as otherw lse pro\ ided or as pn\ lleged, the detense shall disclose to the prosecutor such information as 
required b> statute relating to alibi or insanit) and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the prosecutor to adequate!) prepare his case 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as soon 
as practicable He has a continuing duty to make disclosure 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may make disclosure by notifying the op-
posing party that material and information may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and 
places The prosecutor or defense may impose reasonable limitations on the further dissemination of sensitive 
information otherwise subject to discovery to prevent improper use of the information or to protect victims and 
witnesses from harassment, abuse, or undue invasion of privacy, including limitations on the further dissemination 
of videotaped interv lews, photographs, or psychological or medical reports 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or 
deferred, that limitations on the further dissemination of discovery be modified or make such other order as is 
appropriate Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make such showing, m whole or in part, in 
the form of a written statement to be inspected by the judge alone If the court enters an order granting relief 
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be sealed and preserved in the 
records of the court to be made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed 
to comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a con- tinuance, 
or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under 
the circumstances 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: (1) appear in a lineup; (2) speak for 
identification; (3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; (4) pose for photographs not 
involving reenactment of the crime; (5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; (6) permit the taking of 
samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and other bodily materials which can be ob- tained without 
unreasonable intrusion; (7) provide specimens of handwriting; (8) submit to reasonable physical or medical 
inspection of his body; and (9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of the alleged 
offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the 
time and place of such appearance shall be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to 
appear or to comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the court, without reasonable 
excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in 
chief for consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and shall be subject to such 
further sanctions as the court should deem appropriate. 
